



Revista de
Estudios
Kantianos





Revista de
Estudios
Kantianos

Revista de Estudios Kantianos

Publicación internacional de la Sociedad de Estudios Kantianos en Lengua Española
Internationale Zeitschrift der Gesellschaft für Kant-Studien in Spanischer Sprache
International Journal of the Society of Kantian Studies in the Spanish Language

Dirección

Fernando Moledo, FernUniversität in Hagen
fernando.moledo@fernuni-hagen.de

Hernán Pringe, CONICET-Universidad de Buenos Aires/
Universidad Diego Portales, Santiago de Chile
hpringe@gmail.com

Secretario de edición

Óscar Cubo Ugarte, Universitat de València
oscar.cubo@uv.es

Secretaria de calidad

Alba Jiménez Rodríguez, Universidad Complutense de Madrid
albjim04@ucm.es

Editores científicos

Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, UNED, Madrid
Claudia Jáuregui, Universidad de Buenos Aires
Vicente Durán, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Bogotá
Julio del Valle, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, Lima
Jesús Conill, Universitat de València
Gustavo Leyva, Universidad Autónoma de México, México D. F.
María Xesús Vázquez Lobeiras, Universidade de Santiago de Compostela
Wilson Herrera, Universidad del Rosario, Bogotá
Pablo Oyarzun, Universidad de Chile, Santiago de Chile
Paula Órdenes Azúa, Universität Heidelberg

Comité científico

Juan Arana, Universidad de Sevilla
Reinhardt Brandt, Philipps-Universität Marburg
Mario Caimi, Universidad de Buenos Aires
Monique Castillo, Université de Paris-Est
Adela Cortina, Universitat de València
Bernd Dörflinger, Universität Trier
Norbert Fischer, Universität Eichstätt-Ingolstadt
Miguel Giusti, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
Dulce María Granja, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
Christian Hamm, Universidad Federal de Santa María, Brasil
Dietmar Heidemann, Université du Luxembourg
Otfried Höffe, Universität Tübingen
Claudio La Rocca, Università degli Studi di Genova
Juan Manuel Navarro Cordón, Universidad Complutense, Madrid
Carlos Pereda, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
Gustavo Pereira, Universidad de la República, Uruguay
Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo, Universidade Estadual Paulista, Brasil
Margit Ruffing, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
Gustavo Sarmiento, Universidad Simón Bolívar, Venezuela
Sergio Sevilla, Universitat de València
Roberto Torretti, Universidad Diego Portales, Santiago de Chile
Violetta Waibel, Universität Wien
Howard Williams, University of Aberystwyth
Allen W. Wood, Indiana University

Diseño, revisión de estilo, corrector y maqueta

Josefa Ros Velasco, Harvard University, Cambridge (MA)

Entidades colaboradoras

Sociedad de Estudios Kantianos en Lengua Española (SEKLE)
Departament de Filosofia de la Universitat de València
Instituto de Humanidades, Universidad Diego Portales





Índice

Artículos

- 1 El concepto teórico de libertad según Kant y la tradición de la *libertas spontaneitatis*
Thomas Sören Hoffmann
DOI 10.7203/REK.4.1.14849

- 21 From the unity of sensible intuition to the sensible unity of intuition. Revisiting the proof-structure of Kant's B-Deduction argument
Adriano Perin
DOI: 10.7203/REK.4.1.12644

- 44 The Principle of the Transcendental Deduction. The First Section of the *Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding*
Rudolf Meer
DOI: 10.7203/REK.4.1.14339

- 63 ¿Por qué son —según Kant— imposibles las hipótesis en matemática?
Reyna Fortes
DOI: 10.7203/REK.4.1.12777

- 90 El reino de los fines y la comunidad ética. Acerca de la dimensión intersubjetiva de la ética kantiana
Ileana Beade
DOI: 10.7203/REK.4.1.12775

Recensiones

- 113 Mario Caimi: *Kant's B Deduction*. Newcastle upon Tyne, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014, 140 pp. ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-6537-1
Paola Rumore
DOI: 10.7203/REK.4.1.14280
- 121 Gustavo Leyva, Álvaro Peláez y Pedro Stepanenko (Eds.): *Los rostros de la razón: Immanuel Kant desde Hispanoamérica* (3 volúmenes). México, UAM-Cuajimalpa/Anthropos, 2018, 727 pp. ISBN (UAM): 978-607-28-1348-9/ISBN (Anthropos): 978-84-16421-91-6
Francisco Javier Iracheta Fernández
DOI: 10.7203/REK.4.1.14135
- 134 Ileana Beade: *La libertad y el orden en la filosofía jurídica kantiana*. Rosario, Fhumyar Ediciones, 2017, 310 pp. ISBN: 978-987-3638-16-9
Marilín Gómez
DOI: 10.7203/REK.4.1.14266
- 138 Christian Krijnen (Ed.): *Metaphysics of Freedom? Kant's Concept of Cosmological Freedom in Historical and Systematic Perspective*. Leiden/Boston, Brill (Critical Studies in German Idealism, vol. 23), 2018, 221 pp. ISBN: 978-90-40-38377-7
Jacinto Páez
DOI: 10.7203/REK.4.1.14337

Traducción

- 145 Salomon Maimon frente a la filosofía trascendental. Traducción de algunas cartas sobre su filosofía teórica
David Hereza Modrego
DOI: 10.7203/REK.4.1.13956

Informes

- 173 Informe del IV Congreso Internacional de la SEKLE
Alejandra Baher
Luciana Martínez
DOI: 10.7203/REK.4.1.14281

- 178 Ata do Simpósio Internacional de Kant a Hegel
Agemir Bavaresco
Jair Tauchen
Evandro Pontel
DOI: 10.7203/REK.4.1.14269

Eventos y normas para autores

- 185 Normas para autores



Recensiones

Mario Caimi: *Kant's B Deduction*. Newcastle upon Tyne, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014, 140 pp. ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-6537-1

PAOLA RUMORE¹

The volume by Mario Caimi—published in the series “Kantian Questions”, edited by Pablo Muchnik—presents the English translation of his previous *Leçons sur Kant. La déduction transcendentale dans la deuxième édition de la “Critique de la raison pure”* (Paris, 2007), originated in a lecture he held at the Sorbonne in 2004.

According to its original didactical aim, the volume follows the structure of the Transcendental Deduction in the form it assumes in the second edition of the *Critique of pure reason*. The idea of providing a commentary on one of the most controversial parts of Kant’s first *Critique*, instead of suggesting a new general interpretation of its role within the transcendental philosophy is the outcome of a clear methodological choice. Let’s *read* what Kant wrote instead of *interpreting*, seems to be the very reasonable claim Caimi puts at the very basis of his enterprise. Nevertheless, his carefully textual approach provides *malgré lui* a very specific interpretation of Kant’s text, suggesting a way of understanding the central problem of the transcendental philosophy—i.e. the relationship between representation and object—from a clearly new perspective. Thus, Caimi’s methodological approach suggests facing the argument of the B-Deduction as *a whole*, instead of looking at it as at a bunch of particular issues which have to be analyzed separately. This kind of investigation is driven by three statements that Caimi explicitly presents at the very beginning of his examination. First, the centrality of the Principle of Apperception, whose synthetic enrichment Caimi considers to be the line that runs through the development of Kant’s argument. Second, the claim of a ‘negative purpose’ for the Deduction, whose task is to prove that the categories are not empty concepts at all; but the other

¹ Università degli Studi di Torino. Contact: paola.rumore@unito.it.

way round it means: what would happen if the Deduction should fail, and categories turn out to be concepts without contents? Third, the importance of the “synthetic method” that Kant seems to follow in the general elaboration of his work (2014: XI).

According to the first of the mentioned issues, the main goal of Caimi's approach is to show that the entire argument of the Deduction consists in a “progressive enlargement and enrichment of the Principle of Apperception” (2014: XI). This is coherent with the idea that this seems actually to be the general pattern that Kant adopts in each part of the *Critique*. In fact, according to Caimi Kant's general idea of ‘philosophical investigation’—from the early 1760s up to the *Critique*—is perfectly consistent with the methodological concern of tradition of the German Enlightenment, in the sense that Kant himself seems to understand the task of philosophy as the increasing of the degree of distinction of concepts which are initially confused and whose origins are undetermined. Caimi summarizes this claim as follows:

In order to attain this distinction, the philosopher must first isolate the elements of the concept and study them separately. He must isolate a single element and bring it to distinction. This leads him to other elements which might have possibly been unknown to him but which are hereafter necessarily required for the complete analysis of the first element. [...] The new elements, so introduced, are in turn brought to distinction and joined to the first element. This procedure is repeated in a synthesis of increasing complexity, until the searcher is in a position to reconstruct the original concept, but now with entire clarity and distinction (2014: 12).

This is the way Kant follows in the first *Critique*, whose method of isolating elements is explicitly declared in the Transcendental Doctrine of *Elements*, which reveals the difficulty to explain the unity of consciousness by means of a mere passive sensibility, and compels Kant to introduce a new element, the active faculty of understanding, which is again analyzed in its components (in the Transcendental Logic), brought to distinction, and then synthesized with sensibility in a more complex synthesis in the chapter on the transcendental faculty of judgment. “The *Critique* [asserts Caimi] is built following this method of isolation and progressive synthesis” (2014: 13).

In the case of the Deduction, the starting point is the very general and vague concept of 'combination in general', that is of a 'synthesis' related to a 'manifold'. The three chapters of Caimi's book follow the progressive unfolding and enrichment of this principle in the Deduction, focusing on the question of "Unity and the Object" (ch. 1, which analyses §15-§20 of Kant's text), of "The Application of the Categories" (ch. 2, which concerns §21-§25), and finally of "The Application of the Categories to Real Objects" (ch. 3 for §26-§27).

Unfolding the initially indeterminate concept of combination Caimi isolates, following Kant, three elements which are necessary to conceive it, namely, a manifold, a synthetic action, and a rule. In fact, a synthesis requires a manifold to be synthesized, the thought of a unity, and an intellectual rule which allows us to bring to an end the otherwise endless repetition of the synthesis provided by the imagination, and which provides the unity of the representation (for instance, the unity of the representation of a specific number, which is obtained by means of the rule represented by the concept of that number that commend to stop adding units once that number is reached). It is precisely the thought of unity that works as the condition both of the manifold, and of its synthesis; a (qualitative) unity that Caimi explains in an extremely clear way following a rather obscure suggestion Kant makes in B 114, where he compares it to "the unity of the theme in a play, a speech, or a story". Taking these examples in a rigorous and literal sense, Caimi states that the 'play' we should consider in reading Kant's text is that of (possible) experience, which must be 'one', only one, as well as the subject of such experience. Experience—the play of experience—has its own unity; despite its variety, it is necessarily the experience of one subject, of the one and only Self. This is the way that leads Kant to the introduction of the unity of apperception in §16, with the notorious claim "It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations" (B131-132), a principle that represents the red thread that runs through the paragraphs of the Deduction, and whose unfolding and synthetic enrichment allows to rethink in a more perspicuous way the general structure and the whole argument of the text.

The process of determination of the originally vague concept of combination has led to the concept of the Self, which implies the concepts of unity of consciousness, of the identity of the Self, and of Self-consciousness (apperception). These concepts are all included in the so-called

Supreme Principle of Understanding, i.e. to the principle that the manifold must be referred to the unity of apperception. The reciprocal implication of Self and manifold (the data of intuition) requires to enrich the concept of synthesis with the introduction of the concept of object. This is what is provided in §17 of the Deduction, where the object of knowledge is the new element that enlarges the principle of apperception, in the sense that at this point we are no longer dealing with the mere possession of representations, but with representations insofar they refer to something else, that is to the object. The conception of the object as a collection of predicates united by a concept that works as a rule of the synthesis establishes that objectivity is nothing but the necessity shown by certain synthesis, a necessity which is due to their being ruled by a concept. The unity provided by this rule is not merely analytic, but synthetic, because it is based on the necessary unity of apperception. In Caimi's words: "such a fundamental synthesis supplies the universally necessary rule of all synthesis of representations: the Principle of Apperception" (2014: 40). It allows the representation to pass from a mere subjective to a proper *objective* validity. Intuitive representations can become *objects*.

Proceeding along this line of unfolding and enriching the concepts he is dealing with, in §18-§19 Kant adds to the principle of (objective unity) of apperception the concept of *judgment*, which allows him a more precise formulation of the principle we have read in B131, that now sounds: "all the manifold of intuition (formerly 'all my representations') must be subject to (capable of being accompanied by) the logic-transcendental form of judgment (the objective unity of self-consciousness, the 'I think')" (2014: 56). Being the form of judgment the condition of the objectivity of the object itself, it *refers* to the object. Kant can, therefore, reach the goal of the Deduction (how do *a priori* concepts may refer to object?) by showing that this form is itself an *a priori* concept or that it contains *a priori* concepts. And that's what he accomplishes by mean of the introduction of the pure concepts of the understanding, the categories, now presented as the "functions of judgment, in so far as they are employed in determination of the manifold of a given intuition" (§20, B143). It means that determining the manifold of intuition with respect to the transcendental form of judgment is identical with determining the manifold of intuition according to the categories. Caimi's claim that the argumentative structure of the Deduction can be read as a progressive enlargement of the Principle of Apperception formulated in B131

finds here its confirmation, since the statement that the manifold of intuition is necessarily subjected to the categories means nothing but that the subjection under categories is the condition for the manifold of intuition to be brought into one consciousness (see 2014: 59).

The further development of the Principle of Apperception allows Kant to introduce the distinction between *thinking* and *knowing* an object (§22), and the related restriction of the validity of the categories to the sole knowledge of sensible *empirical* objects (§23), to a material which is somehow 'alien' to the subject. If the deduction should fail to demonstrate that categories refer to empirical objects, one should admit that they are nothing but empty concepts. Caimi is progressively moving to the second step of his investigation (2014: ch. 2), where he follows Kant in showing that categories would be empty if they referred to a manifold which is barely *thought* (i.e. possible) and not actually *given* (i.e. real, sensible). The problem of the emptiness of a concept had already been at the center of an important work Caimi published in 2005—"Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer" (*Kant-Studien*, XCVI, 135-146)—, where he stressed the originality of the Kantian formula within the context of the Leibnizian and Wolffian understanding of representations. It is on the basis of the new understanding of empty concepts as concepts which have no corresponding intuition, that Caimi sees one of the main tasks of the Deduction in a negative purpose, namely in the necessity to show that categories *are not* empty (2014: 11, 74). Thus, in §24-§26, Kant considers the relation of the apperception to the 'alien' element contained in the empirical sensible manifold firstly through the investigation of the relation of the understanding to *pure* intuitions, then to the *empirical* manifold. Once again this consideration implies the introduction of new elements in the argumentation, i.e. the element of pure intuition of *time* and that of the function of *imagination*.

At this point of his reconstruction of Kant's argument, Caimi introduces a very insightful "Digression on imagination" (2014: 84-88) which deserves special attention since it presents Kant's account of this particular function in a somehow unusual way, which turns out to be very helpful in understanding its relation both to understanding, and sensibility. Caimi conceives imagination "as being nothing but understanding, insofar as understanding addresses itself to sensibility" (2014: 85). Imagination is namely understanding itself when the latter does not obey exclusively the

laws of logic (the laws of identity and non-contradiction), but to the laws of sensibility too. In fact, when understanding operates within the sensible manifold of space or time, it does not follow barely the logical laws but also the laws of time that rule the transition from one representation to another. Only by means of those laws, two representations can be one 'before' the other, or 'successive', or 'simultaneous'. It means that imagination turns out to be something more than the faculty to represent an absent object, as in the philosophical tradition Kant belonged to. Furthermore, by saying that imagination is "the faculty of representing in intuition an object even if it is not itself present" (B151), Kant intends to stress that imagination performs its synthesis with no regard to the fact that the object is present or absent. Imagination is not limited to a reproductive function; it performs an *apprehension*, that is a kind of synthesis, and is, therefore, a spontaneous function. More precisely: a function of the understanding whose specific feature lies in its being referred to sensibility.

The "application of the categories to real object" is the topic of the last chapter of Caimi's book, entirely focused on the analysis of the final paragraphs of the Deduction (§26-§27). It is in §26 that Kant comes to the demonstration that categories cannot be empty concepts since they are applied to actually existing objects. It means that in this paragraph Kant manages to overcome the gap between the empirical manifold and pure thought, proving the validity of the categories not only in relation to the *pure form of sensibility* but also in relation to the *empirical contents of intuition* (the object). In order to make clear which are the steps followed by Kant in achieving this result, Caimi formulates the problem of the Deduction (how is it possible for the categories to relate to empirical objects?) conversely (in conformity with B160): "how can empirical objects possibly be subject to those laws of synthesis which are thought in the *a priori* concepts?" (2014: 102-103). The path Kant follows goes from proving that every empirical representation is subject to the synthesis of apperception (B160-163) to the demonstration that all phenomena must be subject to the laws of understanding (B163-165). Distancing himself from De Vleeschauwer's groundbreaking interpretation according to which the three syntheses of the A-Deduction (apprehension, reproduction, recognition) are all included in the unique synthesis of apprehension of the B-Deduction (§26), Caimi argues that Kant text should be taken literally since it is the sole synthesis of apprehension the one that has to synthesize the empirical manifold, incorporating it into the unity of

apperception (2014: 103). And it occurs by means of the accordance between the synthesis of apprehension and the *a priori* condition that consists in the synthetic unity of the intuitive manifold of space and time (the figurative synthesis provided by the imagination, according to which there are *only one* space and *only one* time), which in turn is achieved by means of synthesis ruled by the categories. Thus, the synthesis of apprehension is itself subject to the categories, as Kant states in B161. Caimi proves the reliability of his reading recalling in an accurate examination the two famous examples Kant introduces in B162-163, namely the example of the house and the one of the water (2014: 107-113). In both cases it is now clear that presupposing the empirical multiplicity the figurative synthesis of imagination, it is subject to the categories. Therefore categories are necessarily related not only to a possible object of the sensible intuition but also to *actual* objects of *empirical* sensible intuition. It means that categories are not empty concepts at all. *Quod erat demonstrandum*.

This cursory look into Caimi's useful book should have made clear at least the strategy he follows in his approach to the Kantian text. By means of an extremely accurate reading that takes into account both the letter and the goal of the Deduction as the two means that should provide reciprocal support in the reconstruction of Kant's argument, Caimi offers an essential contribution to the clarification of this controversial passage of the first *Critique*. The choice to expand the structure of the argument considered as a whole, instead of clarifying its particular components allows him to show the coherence and the intrinsic unity of the B-Deduction. In the end, the idea of explaining the argument by expanding its structure turns out to be a very successful approach not at least because Caimi follows his very valuable insight according to which "the entire Deduction obeys a single principle, namely the Principle of Apperception" (2014: 123). This principle undergoes an increasing enrichment and determination that allows moving from the concept of the Self as one, identical and self-conscious to the concept of the object, initially conceived as a form of synthesis and then as an *actual* object. The further enlargement of the principle by means of the notion of knowledge and imagination leads to the demonstration that categories are not empty concepts at all and that they do apply to actual empirical objects. Caimi's remarkable insight of bringing the Principle of Apperception at the very core in the argumentation Kant's fundamental problem in the *Critique* offers in fact not only a new, more coherent way of reading the obscure pages of the

Deduction—a goal that deserves by itself huge credit. Besides that, it provides at the same time an efficient counteragent for any longstanding attempt of a psychological misunderstanding of the transcendental philosophy, now deprived of any possible argumentative and textual support.