

PARTITIVE RESTRICTIVE MODIFICATION  
OF NAMES IN ENGLISH: ARGUMENTS FOR  
THEIR METONYMIC MOTIVATION

*Antonio Barcelona Sánchez*  
Universidad de Córdoba

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0. INTRODUCTION<sup>1</sup>

The standard morphosyntactic constraints in English on those names that consist of a single proper noun prevent the combination of plural morphemes, determiners and restrictive modification with them:

(1) *Paris* - \**the Paris* - \**a Paris* - ?*I like the beautiful Paris, but not the ugly one.*

The same limitations apply to the combinations between proper nouns and other words that result in complex names. Take *The Hague*:

(2) *The Hague* - \**Hague* - \**a Hague* - \**I love the good Hague, and I hate the bad Hague*

These limitations are due to the fact that names typically have unique reference. However, standard grammars, like Quirk et al. (1985: 288-297) or Jespersen (1949: 426-429, 488-491, 544-580), in fact devote plenty of space to the numerous cases in which the above constraints are violated. In several papers (Barcelona, 2003b; 2003c; 2004), I have dealt briefly with several of these cases, particularly with the type of constraint violation consisting in the use of proper nouns as “paragons” (Lakoff, 1987), as in *That student is a Shakespeare*. In this paper, I will concentrate on another type of violation of these constraints, namely “partitive restrictive modification” on proper nouns, and I will argue for its metonymic motivation. But, before discussing this claim, I find it necessary to characterize briefly the notion of metonymy

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assumed in this paper (section 1), and to show that the metonymic motivation of grammatical phenomena, rather than being exceptional, is, in fact, quite frequent (section 2).

## 1. NOTION OF METONYMY

The concept of metonymy assumed in the present paper is similar to Kövecses and Radden's (Kövecses and Radden, 1998: 39), here reproduced as (3):

(3) *Metonymy is a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same domain, or ICM.*

In Barcelona (2003a) I proposed to distinguish, for various research purposes, four different general classes of metonymies which progressively constrain their range of membership. *Schematic* metonymies are those that satisfy the minimal requirements for every conceptual metonymy: intra-domain mapping and activation of target by source, irrespective of the neat distinctiveness of source vis-à-vis target. *Typical* metonymies are those schematic metonymies in which the source and the target are neatly distinct (within the super-ordinate overall domain) from each other. *Prototypical metonymies* are those typical metonymies with individuals as targets and as referents (they are the “classical” instances of metonymy). *Conventional metonymies* are typical metonymies which are socially sanctioned in virtue of a number of parameters (see below). In order to explore the grammatical relevance of metonymy it is convenient to assume as broad a notion of metonymy as possible, so that we can detect its presence in the many grammatical structures that can be motivated by it. Therefore, by “metonymy” I will be assuming in the present article the first of these classes. This is the definition offered in Barcelona (2002: 246).

(3) *A schematic metonymy is an asymmetric mapping of a conceptual domain, the source, onto another domain, the target. Source and target are in the same functional domain and are linked by a pragmatic function, so that the target is mentally activated.*

As I stated earlier, this definition and Kövecses and Radden's have several points in common. Both are fairly broad definitions of metonymy, which highlight the fact that metonymy is fundamentally a “reference-point” phenomenon (Langacker, 1993: 29-35). But there are also some significant differences between them. I prefer to use the term *source* (rather than *vehicle*).

For reasons discussed in Barcelona (2003a) I define metonymy as a *conceptual projection* or *mapping*, as claimed by Lakoff and Turner (1989: 103); however, whereas metaphor consists of a set of structural, symmetric sub-mappings or correspondences (a systematic matching of counterparts between source and target), metonymy is a single, asymmetric mapping, with no counterpart matching. I prefer the term *domain* instead of *conceptual entity* because even “entities” are understood in terms of complex domain matrices (Langacker, 1987: chapter 4), and because when metonymy is involved in category structure, it is complex categories, rather than individual entities, that are sources and targets—just think of the stereotype-based metonymic model of “bachelorhood” or “motherhood” (Lakoff, 1987: chapter 8). However, there is no harm in talking about metonymic sources or targets being “entities” in cases in which they are clearly unitary physical objects (including people) with a given role, or their clearly delineated parts<sup>2</sup>. In Barcelona (2002) I specify that the overall domain where metonymy occurs is a “functional domain”, i.e. a “frame” (Fillmore, 1985) or an “I.C.M.” (Lakoff, 1987), and that source and target must be linked by a “pragmatic function” (Fauconnier, 1997), i.e. the role of the source is closely connected in experience to that of the target (AUTHOR-WORK, IMAGE-OBJECT, etc.). The other differences are simply a matter of personal preference.

On the current debate in cognitive linguistics regarding the nature of metonymy, see Benczes, Réka; Barcelona, Antonio and Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez, Francisco-José, eds. (in preparation), with contributions from most of the leading authors in the field.

## 2. METONYMY IN GRAMMAR

Metonymy is regarded by cognitive linguists as a fundamental cognitive model, together with metaphorical, image-schematic and propositional models (Lakoff, 1987: 77-90, 154). All of these models play a crucial role in the grammar of languages, as cognitive linguistics has shown. The study of the role of metonymy in grammar relevance is one of the most recent areas of has only recently begun to be explored, but there is already a substantial body of research demonstrating the metonymic basis of a large number of grammatical phenomena. Langacker (1999: 67) states that though “usually regarded as a semantic phenomenon, metonymy turns out to be central and essential to grammar”, and that grammar is “a rich source for the investigation of metonymy. At the same time, a recognition of its prevalence and centrality

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<sup>2</sup> For instance, PRESIDENT (a person with a role) FOR ARMY, as in *Nixon bombed Hanoi*, or ARM FOR PERSON, as in *We need strong arms*.

is critical not just for describing grammar but for a realistic assessment of its basic nature”. Langacker (in preparation), furthermore, adds that grammar is “basically metonymic, in the sense that the information explicitly provided by conventional means does not itself establish the precise connections apprehended by the speaker and hearer in using an expression”; that is, grammar only provides a blueprint of that information.

Among the many studies on the interaction of grammar and metonymy, we can only mention the following (the list is simply illustrative):

- The metonymic nature of a great many instances of active zone / profile discrepancy (Langacker, 1993: 33-35; 1999: 200-201; in preparation): topic constructions, certain relational subjects or objects (like *a novel*, standing for the relation “X write / read a novel” in *Zelda began a novel*), certain descriptive adjectives (like *fast* in *Therese is fast*), “raising” in general (Langacker, 1991: 189-201; 1995; 1999: 317-360), and relative-clause constructions. Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2004) is an excellent paper on the cross-linguistic differences between English constructions with metonymy-based “raising” adjectives and the corresponding constructions in other languages.
- Anaphora resolution (Langacker, 1999: Ch. 7 and 9; in preparation; Ruiz de Mendoza & Otal, 2002).
- Various aspects of clausal constructions (Caballero, in preparation; Ziegeler and Lee, in preparation; Brdar-Szabó, in preparation; Peña and Ruiz de Mendoza, in preparation).
- Certain types of conversion (Dirven, 1999; Kövecses and Radden, 1998: 60 commenting on Clark and Clark, 1979; Radden, 2005: 16-17; Barcelona, 2004; in preparation a, in preparation c)
- Other word-formation processes, including certain types of derivation and compounding (Panther and Thornburg, 2002; Radden, 2005: 17-20; Barcelona, 2008 on *bahuvrihi* compounds; Basilio, in preparation; Palmer, Rader and Clarito, in preparation).
- Aspectual shift (Panther and Thornburg, in preparation) and the use of stative lexemes (verbs, adjectives, etc) in dynamic contexts (Panther and Thornburg, 2000).
- Proper names and noun phrases (Brdar & Brdar-Szabó, in preparation; Brdar (2007a), including generic NPs (Radden, in preparation).
- Grammaticalization processes (e.g. Traugott and Dasher, 2002; Guarddon, in preparation).

Two useful surveys on the wide-ranging interaction between metonymy and grammar are Ruiz de Mendoza and Otal Campo (2002) and Brdar (2007b). See also Panther, Thornburg & Barcelona, eds. (in preparation) and Barcelona (in preparation a, in preparation c).

### 3. THE “IRREGULAR” BEHAVIOR OF NAMES IN TWO STANDARD GRAMMARS

This issue is dealt with by three standard grammars: Greenbaum and Quirk (1990), Quirk et al. (1985), and Jespersen (1949). Many of the observations presented in the older handbook are incorporated by the two later books, which deal systematically with this issue. Their discussion of the various types of violations of the grammatical constraints on names is summarized as below (the examples are drawn indistinctly from either book)<sup>3</sup>:

(a) Different referents with the same name: *There is a Richmond in the south of England and a Richmond in the north, not to mention a dozen Richmonds outside the British Isles* (places with the same name) // *The Dr Brown I know comes from Ireland, not from Scotland.*

No generic statements are possible with these cases: \*Richmonds *are always splendid for a vacation.*

(b) Different referents with the same name, which also constitute a conceptual class. For example, names of week days constitute a class in virtue of the properties they share (Mondays are the first working day of the week; every Christmas shares with the others even more sharply defined characteristics): *She always spends her Mondays / Octobers / Christmases here.* The same applies to names of months and festivals,

(c) Uses due to “informal conventions”:

(c-1) Married couples and families: *The Wilsons.*

(c-2) Use of a famous name to mean the type that made it famous: *There were no Shakespeares in the nineteenth century* [example paraphrased by Quirk & Greenbaum as “...writers who towered over contemporaries as William Shakespeare did over his”, and by Quirk et al as “authors like Shakespeare”].

(d) Names subject to modification:

(d-1) Uses due to what these grammars call “partitive restrictive modification”: *In the England of Queen Elizabeth / The Chicago I like / The*

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<sup>3</sup> The 1990 grammar attempts to explain some of the irregularities in conceptual terms. Therefore, I reflect below the general classification provided by this grammar, adding to it some of the more relevant remarks in the 1985 handbook.

young Joyce *already showed signs of the genius that was to be fulfilled in Ulysses*.

(d-2) Uses due to nonrestrictive modification, either colloquial and stereotyped (Poor old *Mrs Fletcher*) or formal and often stylized (*The fondly remembered John F. Kennedy*).

(e) Miscellaneous: *A Rolls Royce/This museum has several Renoirs/A pack of Chesterfields*.

The term “partitive restrictive modification” is not explained by Greenbaum and Quirk (1990). Quirk et al (1985: 290) explain it by saying that “cataphoric *the* with restrictive modification can have the effect of splitting up the unique referent of the proper noun into different parts or *aspects*” [my italics]. Therefore, they classify this as a type of partitive meaning.

Both grammars say that in all of the cases in table 1 names are transiently reclassified as common nouns<sup>4</sup>. Jespersen (1949: 426, 544, 573-577) records the uses in paragraph (c-2) of the table, but not instances of partitive restrictive modification.

Apart from the instances listed above, the general “rules” for the use or omission of the definite article with certain names (e.g. with geographical and other names, etc.) are discussed extensively by the three standard grammars. We have no space to deal with them here, although a conceptual motivation could probably be discerned for many of them, too (see, in this respect, Radden and Dirven, 2007: Ch. 5).

An initial published attempt at a conceptual explanation of *all* of these “irregular” uses in terms of conceptual metonymy is Barcelona (2003b) and in Barcelona (n.d.). The uses referred to above as c-2 are also known as “paragon” uses of names (Lakoff, 1987: 87-88). I offered a metonymic account both of these uses and of partitive restrictive modification in a crosslinguistic study in Barcelona (2003c). And in Barcelona (2004) (written at about the same time but published later) I carried out a detailed investigation of the metonymic motivation for the use of names as paragons in English.

As stated in section 1, the present paper is an in-depth discussion of the metonymic motivation of partitive restrictive modification of names in English (the uses listed above as d-1). The discussion in the following section greatly

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<sup>4</sup> This transient reclassification occasionally becomes permanent. These are just some examples: *a mackintosh* ‘a type of raincoat’ (derived from *Mackintosh*, the inventor of this type of raincoat: INVENTOR FOR INVENTION, a subtype of AUTHOR FOR WORK); *a Xerox* ‘a photocopy’ (from *Rank Xerox*, the company manufacturing the first photocopying machines: PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT AND INSTRUMENT FOR OBJECT INVOLVED IN ACTION); *a Jeremiah* ‘someone characterised by making gloomy predictions’ (from *Jeremiah*, the prophet, a paragon of this type of people: CHARACTERISTIC PROPERTY FOR ENTITY and STEREOTYPICAL MEMBER FOR CATEGORY; see Barcelona, 2004).

expands on and specifies the claims made in Barcelona (2003b) and Barcelona (2003c).

#### 4. METONYMIC ANALYSIS OF NON-PARAGON NAMES WITH PARTITIVE RESTRICTIVE MODIFICATION

I offer below a somewhat clearer classification of the instances of names subject to modification enumerated in paragraph (d) of the previous section. Names subject to modification can be of two main kinds:

(a) Names subject to non-restrictive modification: *Poor old Mrs. Fletcher is standing in her kitchen.*

(b) Names subject to restrictive modification, with two further subtypes:

(b-1) Non-partitive: *The Dr Brown I know comes from Ireland, not from Scotland.* This type of restrictive modification is often associated with special use (a) in section 3 (i.e. different referents with the same name).

(b2) Partitive: *The young Joyce was already a great writer* (referring to the writer as a young man).

In Barcelona (2003b), and Barcelona (n.d.) strong arguments were presented for the claim that both the non-restrictive modification (a) and the non-partitive restrictive modification (b-1) of names is motivated by metonymy. In the rest of this section, therefore, I concentrate on the main topic of the paper, namely the conceptual motivation of *partitive restrictive* modification.

Partitive restrictive modification, like all of the “irregular” uses of names listed in section 3 (especially their use as paragons; Barcelona (2003b, 2004; Brdar 2007a) is evidence that names are often understood against the background of an experience-based conceptual network, which is brought to bear on their interpretation and their use. In this respect, then, they are not really different from common nouns. The main difference is that names normally have unique reference, whereas common nouns must enter phrasal referring expressions to be referential. However, the conceptual network underlying a name can be invoked, and certain “aspects or circumstances”, that is, “sub-domains”, included in it can be focused on and singled out. In the use under discussion, the *referent* of the name, which is regularly construed as a unitary entity, is figuratively “split up” and re-categorized as a class of entities. How is this partition achieved? In my view, at least the roots of the partition are metonymic. The following is one of the examples of partitive restrictive modification borrowed from Greenbaum & Quirk (1990: 88):

(4) *The young Joyce already showed signs of the genius that was to be fulfilled in Ulysses.*

In this example, the prominent (sub)domain in the knowledge network associated with the individual James Joyce, the writer, is that of AGE SCALE (YOUTH in this case). More precisely, the domain associated with JOYCE that ultimately becomes “active” as a mental space (Fauconnier, 1997) in this example, is the whole domain of JOYCE’S BIOGRAPHY, activated by AGE SCALE, the latter being activated in turn by the *direct* activation of one of the sub-domains of this AGE SCALE: YOUTH. In other words, the example could be roughly paraphrased as *As a young man* (YOUTH  $\Rightarrow$  AGE SCALE  $\Rightarrow$  BIOGRAPHY), *Joyce already showed signs...* This “activation chain” can be claimed to be itself metonymic, with each domain successively activating (as PARTS) the domain including them (YOUTH presupposes an AGE SCALE and jointly they presuppose BIOGRAPHY, etc.). But the activation chain facilitates the really relevant factor motivating the use of this partitive restrictive modification, namely the active zone metonymy which leads to the mapping of the cognitive domain JOYCE onto one of its possible active zones: JOYCE WHEN YOUNG. This active zone constitutes a relation involving JOYCE (i.e. the relation is the predication of youth on Joyce) which is situated at a time period determined by the active mental space JOYCE’S BIOGRAPHY. This time period does not coincide with speech or writing time (i.e the time of uttering example (4), if it was part of a spoken utterance, or with the time of writing the corresponding sentence, if it was part of a written text): It is necessarily prior to it, due not only to the past tense of the verb *showed* but also, and fundamentally, to the currently active mental space, which necessarily discusses past situations.

The noun phrase *The young Joyce* in this sentence is, thus, understood as referring to “Joyce at the time when he was young”, not to a neutral, holistic notion of Joyce independent from any specific circumstances affecting him. Note that the paraphrase provided by Greenbaum and Quirk for this example is ‘Even while he was young, James Joyce...’.

#### 4.1. *A summary of the properties of active zone metonymies*

In order to understand this claim properly, we should first characterize in some detail the notion of “active zone metonymy”, as put forward by Langacker. An “active zone” can be a portion of the entity profiled (in Langacker’s sense of “profile”) by a linguistic expression; this portion is crucially and directly involved in a relationship in which the entity as a whole participates. In Langacker’s well-known example *Your dog bit my cat*, “certain portions of



the dog<sup>5</sup> (notably the teeth and jaws) are directly and crucially involved in the biting, and others (e.g. the tail and pancreas) hardly at all” (Langacker, 1999: 62). And only some unspecified portion of the cat suffers the biting.

But an active zone does not have to be a sub-part of the entity conventionally profiled by a linguistic expression, as in the above metonymic uses of *dog* and *cat*. It may be just another entity or relationship closely associated in encyclopedic knowledge with the profiled entity. Langacker says that the active zone may simply be located in the profiled entity’s “dominion” (Langacker, 1999: 200-201), which is equivalent to a “domain” - in the sense of “domain” used in this paper and in the standard cognitive linguistic definitions of metaphor and metonymy (e.g. Kövecses and Radden, 1998, Lakoff and Turner, 1989: 103). In more precise terms, we can say that the active zone may simply be located in the *frame* associated to the profiled entity.

Active zone/profile discrepancy is, according to Langacker, a type of metonymy, ubiquitous and essential to language (1999: 67, 200, 331)<sup>6</sup>. Langacker makes the important point that active zone / profile discrepancy is the normal situation in cognition and in language (1999: 62-63), there being very few cases in which such discrepancy does not operate. He also claims that resorting to periphrases mentioning the active zone is “otiose unless they provide information not otherwise available” (1999: 65). An example is *She blinked her big blue eyes*, where explicit mention of the eyes as the object nominal referring to the subject’s active zone with respect to blinking, “allows the specification of their properties” (1999: 64).

A fundamental consequence of the flexibility in active zone selection is that an active zone can be another relationship in which a profiled participant is involved. In these cases, the occurrence of active zone / profile discrepancy can actually be predicted, because “a relation is intrinsically associated with its participants, which usually have greater cognitive salience (owing to concreteness or to their nominal character)” (1999: 66), and so constitute natural metonymic “reference points” for the relationships in which the participants are involved<sup>7</sup>. Some examples were cited earlier: sentences like *Zelda began a novel*, *Therese is fast*. In raising constructions, the additional

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<sup>5</sup> This type of animal is the entity holistically profiled in the conventional prototypical meaning of the lexeme *dog*. And a token of this type is the entity holistically profiled in the prototypical meaning of the noun phrase *your dog*.

<sup>6</sup> On the metonymic status of active zone/ profile discrepancy, see Paradis (2004; in preparation), who denies it any metonymic status; and Peirsman and Geeraerts (in preparation) and Barcelona, who claim that certain instances of zone activation are clearly metonymic while others are doubtfully so.

<sup>7</sup> Langacker claimed long ago (see 1993: 29ff) that metonymy in general is a type of reference point phenomenon, with the source functioning as a reference point.


relationship constituting the active zone of the participant coded as subject or object is often explicitly mentioned because it provides information not otherwise available. For instance, in *Mary is easy to please*, the active zone of the subject nominal *Mary* is the relationship coded by the infinitive clause. The explicit mention of the active zone is necessary, because the speaker intends to specify that the participant *Mary* can be placed on a scale of relative difficulty only with respect to the relationship “X please Mary”. Other examples are *Fred is really slow at paying his debts* or *When it comes to paying his debts, Fred is really slow*: “it is only by engaging in some process, in this case *pay his debts*, that an individual can be located on a scale of relative speed” (Langacker 1999: 66).

#### 4.2. The active zone analysis of partitive restrictive modification

Now we are in a position to begin to understand why partitive restrictive modification can be claimed to be conceptually motivated by an active zone metonymy.

This type of modification on names is motivated by a metonymic mapping of a given participant in the overall relationship coded by the clause onto an active zone of that participant. In example (4), the speaker maps the participant, in this case the unique individual JOYCE, onto one of the possible active zones of the latter, namely a temporally earlier relationship in which this participant was involved: that of JOYCE WHEN YOUNG. This relationship is one of the many circumstances affecting this participant (in this case, one of the many biographical circumstances affecting him), all of them part of his “dominion”, that is, part of the domain JOYCE. In other words, we have a discrepancy between the profile of the name *Joyce* (which profiles an individual “in toto”) and its active zone. See Figure 1

Figure 1: Metonymic motivation of the partitive restrictive modification in example 4.



The active zone is made *partially* explicit in this example thanks to the modifier *young*. The reason for doing so is that this mention provides information not otherwise available. Note that the speaker might not have made the active zone explicit, among other reasons because he (perhaps wrongly) had assumed that his listeners could figure out (on the basis of context and / or general background knowledge) the relevant active zone of JOYCE in this example. For instance, he might just have said *Joyce already showed signs of the genius that was to be fulfilled in Ulysses*, meaning, in fact, something like *When he was young, Joyce already...*, and leaving the active zone of *Joyce* implicit. The active zone of the subject with respect to “being fast” would also remain implicit in a sentence like *Therese is fast*, but it might also be recovered from context (e.g. “fast at typing”)<sup>8</sup>. But this does not mean that the choice of active zone is unconstrained in this case. The complex relation “Joyce show signs of the genius that was to be fulfilled in Ulysses” is temporally grounded in the past<sup>9</sup>, specifically in a period in Joyce’s biography taking place before an event (Joyce’s genius being fulfilled in *Ulysses*) which is known to have occurred in a later period of his biography. This specific grounding of the complex relationship profiled by the clause constrains the choice of other relationships as active zone interpretations of its main participant (“Joyce”): They must have the same temporal grounding. That is, given an adequate knowledge of Joyce’s biography, in the sentence *Joyce already showed signs of the genius that was to be fulfilled in Ulysses*, listeners can understand by *Joyce* “Joyce as he wrote *Dubliners*”, “Joyce in 1910” (he was born in 1882), “Joyce when young”, etc., but not “Joyce when middle-aged”, or “Joyce as he wrote *Finnegan’s Wake*”. Since this constraint does not reduce the range of options to just one, the speaker may still have a communicative motive to unequivocally single out one active zone. In example (4), the motive is to contrast not just Joyce’s early work with his later work, but also to highlight the fact that he was a young man when he produced this early work.

It might be objected that the name *Joyce* in (4) simply stands for that individual, not for that individual as affected by any circumstance, and that it is

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<sup>8</sup> An explanation for the need to mention explicitly in (4) the active zone of the profiled entity *Joyce* with respect to the relationship “Joyce showing signs of the genius... etc.” may be that, contrary to the normal situation (see Langacker, 1999: 62-67, etc.), such circumstances as age or profession, are not automatically understood as active zones of the profiled entity with respect to a relationship in which it may be involved. Compare with the automatic mapping (with minimal contextual support) of participants onto their body parts as active zones (a. z.) with respect to such relationships as biting (a. z.: mouth), hitting (a. z.: fist, hand), kicking (a. z.: foot), etc.: *The dog bit me, The crook hit him hard, Mike kicked the door shut*.

<sup>9</sup> The term “ground” in Cognitive Grammar refers to the speech event and its participants, which can be indicated explicitly by means of deictic elements, among them, tense morphemes, determiners, etc., or remain implicit.

simply the addition of *young* that activates a temporally bounded circumstance, as a sort of space-builder (Fauconnier, 1997: 40). Thus no metonymic analysis of *Joyce* would be necessary. My reply to this objection is that, even if I absolutely agree that *young* is a space-builder, *Joyce* is still metonymic in this example. That this is so can be seen by pointing out the difference between example (4) and example (5):

(5) *The young Joyce is more intelligent than the old Joyce.*

The noun *Joyce* in example (4) has exclusively an active zone reading if the speaker is talking in the year 2009 about James Joyce, the famous Irish novelist, and if both speaker and listener(s) share a basic knowledge of Joyce's biography. That is, the speaker can only be talking about James Joyce the writer when he was a young man, implicitly contrasting, as we said above, his literary skills with those he displayed at a later stage in his life. On the other hand, each of the two occurrences of the noun *Joyce* in example (5) would be interpreted in the normal profile of the noun, i.e. as holistically profiling a different unique individual in each case: The speaker might be talking in the year 2009 about two different members of the *Joyce* family, and contrasting them in terms of their intelligence. In example (5) we have an instance of the special use due to different referents having the same name (use *a*; see section 3); in this case the names have non-partitive restrictive modification to distinguish one referent from the other (see the beginning of section 4 on "non-partitive restrictive modification"). The conceptual motivation of this type of examples (this motivation being a different kind of metonymy, namely NAME FOR INDIVIDUAL) was discussed in Barcelona 2003b.

As we can see, in both examples, as in most linguistic expressions, context and background knowledge are essential to arrive at the intended interpretation; in this case, to carry out either an active zone or a holistic construal of the noun *Joyce*.

The use of the modifier and the determiner in example (4) is triggered and made possible by the speaker's previous *prelinguistic* mental metonymic mapping of "the whole" of JOYCE frame onto an active zone consisting of a specific past relation in which Joyce was involved ("Joyce when young"). As Langacker says (1999: 67), "a variety of grammatical constructions function to identify an active zone when there is reason to make it explicit". Some of the constructions that can be used to indicate a temporally bounded relation involving the profiled entity are *When* clauses (*When he was a young man, Joyce...*), *As* + *NP* constructions (*As a young man, Joyce...*), and partitive restrictive modification with an age adjective, among others. The important

aspect of these periphrases marking the active zone (Langacker, 1999: 65) is that they make totally or partially explicit the covert, yet real “correspondence” (that is the “mapping”) between a profiled entity and its active zone; in cases like example (4), the active zone is made only partially explicit (for further comment on the issue of explicitness, see 4.4).

The fact that zone activation is not easily noticeable does not mean that it is not real. As Langacker claims, active zone / profile discrepancy is the normal situation, and it is so common that it is hardly noticeable. The normal profile of a name is a unitary and unique entity but this entity can be used as a metonymic reference point to one of its possible active zones.

On two further objections to a metonymic analysis, see 4.4.

#### 4.3. *Partition into a figurative class and unique reference in reality. Analogy.*

In partitive restrictive modification, the circumstantial relation constituting the active zone of the name referent is always explicitly or implicitly contrasted with others in the (sub)domain. In example (4), the active zone JOYCE WHEN YOUNG implicitly contrasts with all other relationships involving Joyce within the AGE domain (one of the set of domains constituting the conceptual network or domain matrix for JOYCE’S BIOGRAPHY, which is in turn one of the domain matrices constituting the overall domain JOYCE), since AGE is the specific domain (as a mental space) directly activated by the modifier (i.e. the spacebuilder) *young*. An inherent component of AGE is a measurement scale with several discrete points (the various ages in life), each of which in turn participates in other conceptual networks (i.e. the set of experiences, social beliefs and other types of knowledge socially shared in a given historical period and culture about young, middle-aged and old people). The AGE domain is activated (and through it the a mental space of JOYCES’S BIOGRAPHY) every time that, thanks to a restrictive modifier (*young, old, middle-aged*) or thanks to other grammatical means (e.g. *In his youth / As a young man, Joyce...; In his old age, Joyce...*), a certain point on the age scale is mentioned:

(6) *The young Joyce was already creative* (active zone: JOYCE WHEN YOUNG)

(7) *The middle-aged Joyce wrote his first masterpiece* (active zone: JOYCE WHEN MIDDLE-AGED)

(8) *The aging Joyce published his final masterpiece* (active zone: JOYCE WHEN HE WAS AN AGING MAN)

The circumstantial active zone also contrasts implicitly, but less automatically, with other sub-domains in Joyce’s BIOGRAPHY; one of these sub-domains is AFFECT and within it, LOVE RELATIONSHIPS:

(9) *The Joyce that married Nora Barnacle, an uneducated girl, was a dedicated artist of the first order.*

The active zone in (4) also contrasts implicitly, but even less automatically, with other relationships outside his biography, in which Joyce might participate; one of these might be the admiration for Joyce felt by the speaker:

(10) *The Joyce that I admire most is the author of "Finnegans Wake"*

The contrast between youth as an active zone and other circumstances, biographical or otherwise, as possible active zones of *Joyce*, is only implicit in (4) and in (9-10), and quite explicit in (11-13), the explicit contrast being coded in each example by means of two instances of partitive restrictive modification:


(11) *The young Joyce had not reached yet the literary craftsmanship of the mature Joyce.*

(12) *The young Joyce somehow contrasts with the Joyce that returned to Zurich in 1940.*

(13) *The young Joyce is not the Joyce that I admire most.*

See Figure 2 on this figurative class.

Figure 2: Figurative class of entities consisting of Joyce as involved in various relationships. Based on metonymy in figure 1.



All of these relationships (i.e. all of these possible active zones) constitute a class, whose members are connected by the fact that they are all relationships involving Joyce, the well known writer.

As has been repeatedly mentioned above, the active zones of *Joyce* in example (4) and in examples (6-13) might have been cued grammatically by other means. Why is partitive restrictive modification used, rather than the other devices, and which is its effect?

In my view, there is one additional factor motivating the use of this grammatical pattern: Its analogy with instances of non-partitive restrictive modification on names, like the one in example (5) above (*The young Joyce is more intelligent than the older Joyce*). Both in (4) and (5), two different entities which are members of the same conceptual category by virtue of bearing the same name are distinguished from each other by adding definite determiners and restrictive modifiers to their common name. The only difference is that in (5) the two different entities are *two different unique individuals* (i.e. two different people), whereas in (4) the two different entities are *two different relations involving the same individual*.

The effect of this grammatical pattern in (4) is to *suggest* the existence of a *figurative class* of *distinct* individuals. This is why this modification is called “partitive”. The partition is achieved by grammatically treating the different highlighted relations in which the unitary entity participates (“Joyce as he was young”, “Joyce as he was an aging man”, “Joyce as he wrote Ulysses”, etc.), as a collection of different individuals. Yet, I would like to insist, the ultimate conceptual motivation for the use of this construction is an active zone metonymy (the applicability of this metonymic mapping depending in turn on context and shared background knowledge).

The figurative partition achieved by means of partitive restrictive modification seems to be an instance of what Fauconnier and Turner call *decompression*, whereby a *compressed* (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002), compact notion is figuratively split into some of its components or aspects.

What binds together this class of figuratively different individuals? The fact that they are all, in the space of reality, only “aspects” (i.e. sub-domains) of the same unitary individual (Joyce) and the fact that they are given the very name (reclassified as a common noun) of that unitary individual. Once we have a class we can make definite individuating reference to some of its members, thanks to the narrowing down of the referential scope of the corresponding NP that is jointly achieved by restrictive modifiers and definite determiners: *The young Joyce* vs. *The Joyce that returned to Zurich in 1940* (example 12). A further example with definite individuating reference to a particular set of entities:

(14) *All of these Joyces had one thing in common: they were extremely obstinate.*

(This sentence might come at the end of a paragraph discussing only James Joyce the writer and mentioning, e.g. *The young Joyce*, *The mature Joyce*, and *The Joyce that married Nora*)

In the realm of reality, there is only one unitary entity all the time in reality; that is, in examples (4) and (6-14), the speaker really talks about one and *the same individual*. This is one of the properties distinguishing names with partitive restrictive modification from the use of names as paragons (examples such *Your friend is a real Shakespeare*, listed in section 3 as use *c-2*; see Barcelona, especially 2004). In paragons, the same name is given to *different unique individuals*, which thus constitute a figurative class built on the basis of a common ascribed property – “literary talent” in the *Shakespeare* example). This is also the property that distinguishes partitive from non-partitive restrictive modification (see example (5)): In the latter, two or more unique individuals in reality which bear the same name are distinguished by the properties picked out by the restrictive modifier (“young” vs “older” in example 5).

The fact that the fictional individuals created by means of partitive restrictive modification are, in reality space, just “aspects” or “circumstances” of one and the same unitary individual inevitably constrains the functioning of this figurative class as a real class of unique individuals. This can be shown by the impossibility of expressing any type of generic reference to the fictional class:

(15) *\*Joyces were born in Ireland*

(16) *\*The Joyces were born in Ireland*

(17) *\*The Joyce is a great writer* (cf *The Italian is normally extrovert*)

(18) *\*A Joyce is obstinate* (cf *A student should pay attention to his teacher*)

(referring in each case to the whole “Joyce class” constituted by “Joyce when young”, “Joyce writing Ulysses”, “Joyce marrying Nora Barbacle”, etc.)

#### 4.4. *On two objections on the role of metonymy*

Two objections have been made to my claim regarding the role of metonymy in partitive restrictive modification. These were made by two colleagues some time ago in an exchange of messages on the topic. Here they are:



(a) One of them argued that, in an example like (4), the mental space activated by the adjective *young* is that of someone's youth, so that the expression *The young Joyce* can readily yield the reading "Joyce when young" without any metonymic account being necessary. Even though he did not explicitly say so, this objection might be generalised as the claim that, if the discourse context includes JOYCE'S BIOGRAPHY as one of the mental spaces currently active, then *young* would be a spacebuilder activating one dimension (or "sub-space") of Joyce's biography, namely, JOYCE'S YOUTH, so that the fact that the NP *The young Joyce* in the sentence *The young Joyce already showed signs of the genius that was to be fulfilled in Ulysses* (= example 4) refers to "Joyce when young" can be explained in a straightforward manner by appealing to the activation of JOYCE'S YOUTH within JOYCE'S BIOGRAPHY. No metonymic account would, then, be necessary.

(b) My other colleague argued that in the same example, the "meaning" of the NP *The young Joyce* is roughly the same as that of *Joyce when young* (i.e. that the two expressions are roughly synonymous). Therefore, the metonymic target (JOYCE WHEN YOUNG) of the NP *The young Joyce* in that example is already explicit. Since, according to his conception of metonymy, the metonymic target must remain implicit, no metonymy could be proposed to account for the meaning of the NP.

With respect to the first objection, I must reply that it is simply not true that pointing out the activation of the mental space of YOUTH by the adjective *young* is enough to account for the reading of the NP *The young Joyce* in example (4). That reading is "Joyce when young", which adds a *specific temporal dimension* to the meaning of the NP. The mere activation of YOUTH does not bring about the activation of the specific period when someone was young. It is true that the fact that James Joyce's youth extended over a specific span of time is implicit in the mental space of JOYCE'S BIOGRAPHY, which may be activated through its YOUTH "sub-space"; however, this fact is not highlighted or brought to the reader's or hearer's attention *only* on the basis of the activation of that mental space. Even in a discourse context in which JOYCE'S BIOGRAPHY were active, a sentence like (4) would not be necessarily interpreted as referring to "Joyce when young". It might also be interpreted as referring to "the younger Joyce" (comparing him with his father or with an older relative with the same surname); or even if the current discourse context is discussing Joyce's work during his youth, the sentence could still be interpreted as referring simply to "Joyce who (by the way) was then young" (i.e. the modifier *young* would be non-restrictive and non-partitive; cf. section 3, use d-2, example *The fondly remembered John F. Kennedy*). In any of these contexts, we would still need another factor leading to the temporally bound reading "Joyce when young".

This factor is the active zone metonymy mapping JOYCE onto JOYCE WHEN YOUNG. Note that I claimed above that the mapping is purely conceptual, i.e. from the whole JOYCE frame to a temporally bound active zone relation (JOYCE WHEN YOUNG). This is why I claimed above that the metonymy is prelinguistic, that is, it is purely conceptual though it motivates linguistic behavior (the use of partitive restrictive modification on a name). On the other hand, the objection is also levelled at my purported claim that the NP *The young Joyce* was metonymically mapped onto JOYCE WHEN YOUNG. But that is not exactly my claim.

In sum:

First, even in a discourse in which the more specific mental space JOYCE'S LITERARY BIOGRAPHY within JOYCE'S BIOGRAPHY is active, the most likely interpretation of the NP *The young Joyce* would be JOYCE WHEN YOUNG, but the other interpretations would not be completely discarded. We would still need the active zone mapping. Second, in discourse contexts which have not activated JOYCE'S BIOGRAPHY prior to the occurrence of this sentence, the active zone metonymy is even more necessary both to produce and to interpret this sentence (for example, in a debate on literary creativity in general in which there had been no mention or allusion to Joyce yet, one of the participants might utter sentence (4) to suggest indirectly that Joyce was always highly creative –from his early work).

With respect to the second objection, first of all my claim is not that *The young Joyce* maps onto JOYCE WHEN YOUNG; I claimed that the frame JOYCE is mapped onto the conceptual relation JOYCE WHEN YOUNG, as explained a few lines above. Secondly, the “meaning” of the NP *The young Joyce* is not roughly the same as that of *Joyce when young*, given the multiple ambiguity of *The young Joyce* (see my reply to the first objection) and given the temporal dimension of *Joyce when young*. Thirdly, in any case, I never claimed that a linguistic expression is metonymically mapped onto another linguistic expression; I claimed that a concept (in this case, a frame) is mapped onto another concept (in this case, a temporally bounded relation). Fourthly, the target of the metonymy is not fully explicit; it is at most only partially explicit: The source is JOYCE and the target is the conceptual relation JOYCE WHEN YOUNG, as stated a few lines earlier. Even if one regarded the metonymy that I advocate as a linguistic metonymy (i.e. as a connection between a linguistic expression and its associated meaning, on the one hand, and another linguistic expression and its associated meaning, on the other hand), the temporal dimension contributed by *when* is absent from the source. But the metonymy I propose is, not a metonymy of that sort. As just stated above, it is a purely conceptual metonymy and it links two conceptual entities, not two linguistic expressions. This conceptual metonymy, though,

*motivates* in part a certain linguistic behavior, consisting in this case in the use of the definite article and the partitive restrictive modifier *young* attached to a proper name like *Joyce* (as stated earlier in 4.2, the partial explicitness of the active zone is necessary because it provides information otherwise unavailable). It does seem that the target of prototypical linguistic metonymies is normally implicit, so that implicitness might be established as requirement for these types of metonymy. But the requirement of implicitness for purely conceptual, pre-linguistic metonymies simply makes no sense, because the mapping in these cases is not directly “visible” (it is prelinguistic). This requirement makes sense for linguistic metonymies, where a grammatical construction (typically a lexical item) undergoes a directly observable meaning shift due to metonymy, even if the target sense remains implicit (a shift that may even become conventionalized); cf. shift in the meaning of *hand* in *We need five extra hands at the factory* (“hand”-“manual worker”). But the metonymic understanding of *MOTHER* as a “housewife mother” (Lakoff, 1987) remains at the level of conceptualization and is only revealed discursively in reasoning (*She’s a good mother though she has a demanding job as an executive*), not in an extended (implicit) sense of the lexeme *mother*. And the use of partitive restrictive modification of names depends on the prelinguistic mapping of the whole conceptual network (the frame) associated to the standard referent of the name, *JOYCE* in this case, onto one of its active zones: The metonymy *JOYCE* → *JOYCE WHEN YOUNG* determines the choice of the grammatical pattern *The young Joyce* in example (4); see also section 4.2.

## 5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This paper is intended as a contribution to the study of the role of metonymy in grammar. After briefly surveying recent research on the role of metonymy in the motivation of grammar, I have listed the main types of special uses of names due to their transient reclassification as common nouns. One of these types is the use of partitive restrictive modification on names, the topic of the paper. It has been shown that this construction reflects a figurative splitting of the referent into a class of referents consisting of a number of relations in which the referent may be involved, even though the referent in reality continues to be unique (we refer to the same individual by means of the two mentions of *Joyce* in examples 11-13 above).

It has been argued that this construction is motivated by: (a) A purely conceptual, prelinguistic metonymy mapping the whole cognitive frame associated with the unique referent of the name onto one of its active zones consisting in a relation involving that referent; this metonymy motivates the

aforesaid figurative splitting of the referent into a class and the use of the construction to code the splitting. And (b) the analogy of this construction to instances of non-partitive restrictive modification on names; this type of modification is a means (together with the definite determiners) of achieving definite reference to the various members of the figurative class.

I have finally answered two objections claiming that metonymy plays no role in the motivation of this construction. Among other things, I have shown that the reading “Joyce when (he was) young” in example (4) is motivated in part by an active zone metonymy because the past temporal dimension (“when”) is not activated simply through the activation of the YOUTH mental space or even through the activation of the whole of JOYCE’S BIOGRAPHY mental space: The metonymic account is still necessary. And I have argued that in the metonymy proposed (JOYCE FOR JOYCE WHEN YOUNG) the target is not fully but only partially explicit (in any case the requirement of implicitness does not apply to purely conceptual, prelinguistic metonymies).

One of the most interesting aspects of this research is that it provides further evidence (collected through the research on names by the author and other linguists) for the claim that names are not merely unique designators of entities whose grammatical behavior remains unaffected by the conceptual networks associated with their referents. Quite the opposite, the grammatical behavior of names is constantly governed by our rich knowledge network of their referents (see Michaux, 1998).

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