Defining Life as a Non-Essentialist Natural Kind

Autores/as

  • Jaime Soler Parra Universitat de València

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.7203/qfia.6.2.16053

Resumen

Abstract: The increasing number of proposals to define the concept of life in biology has led some authors to consider this task useless and without sense. All sceptics base their argument on the idea that life is a natural kind with a strong metaphysical commitment. Considering this, the aim of this paper is to explore the concept of life as a non-essentialist natural kind. It is intended to highlight that complex scientific concepts are better understood from points of view that are not constrained by the rigid frameworks of essentialism and the realism/conventionalism dichotomy. 

Keywords: natural kind, definition of life, essentialism, operational definitions. 

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Publicado

2019-11-26

Cómo citar

Soler Parra, J. (2019). Defining Life as a Non-Essentialist Natural Kind. Quaderns De Filosofia, 6(2), 27–41. https://doi.org/10.7203/qfia.6.2.16053
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