Can Artificial Intelligence Interprete Legal Norms? A Problem of Practical Reason
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.7203/CEFD.44.19370
Abstract
The formalization of legal reasoning and, specifically, of legal interpretation is an old dream of our culture. Today, Artificial Intelligence seems ready to comply with this task. Computational theorist and logicians are developing technical tools to structure formal models of legal interpretations useful to IA. However, these efforts have reached only abstract formalizations, but these do not have capabilities to resolve material questions about the correct answer in front of a new case. Algorithms cannot discover, nor evaluate, human problems without the help of programmers; they cannot decide between alternative interpretive hypothesis. At last, IA can not comply with exigencies of practical reason in law.
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