Las acciones discriminatorias en el banquillo. Un estudio conceptual y de razonamiento probatorio

Alejo Joaquín Giles

doi:10.7203/CEFD.48.25767

Autors/ores

Alejo Joaquín Giles Universidad de Génova - Universidad de Girona https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5088-6469

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.7203/CEFD.48.25767

Resum

Este trabajo se ocupa de la prueba de las acciones discriminatorias en dos dimensiones: la conceptual y la epistemológica. Se estructura en torno a dos preguntas. ¿En qué consiste, conceptualmente, una acción discriminatoria? Para abordar los problemas probatorios es necesario lograr claridad acerca de aquello que hay que probar. Una vez obtenida, se advertirá la importancia de trabajar sobre una segunda cuestión: ¿Cómo obtener creencias justificadas acerca de las intenciones y creencias ajenas? Exploraré dos estrategias argumentativas para hacerlo, buscando aumentar la nitidez con que comprendemos el problema que hay detrás del interrogante, así como nuestra habilidad para resolverlo.

Descàrregues

Les dades de descàrrega encara no estan disponibles.

Publication Facts

This article

Author statements

Data availability

N/A

16%

External funding

No

32%

Competing interests

N/A

11%

This journal

Other journals

Articles accepted

2%

33%

Days to publication

163

145

Indexed in

Editor & editorial board: profiles
Academic society: N/A
Publisher: Universitat de València

Referències

Altman, Andrew; “Discrimination”, en The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2020. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/discrimination/.

Ansuini, Caterina, Cavallo, Andrea, Bertone, Cesare y Becchio, Cristina; “Intentions in the Brain: The Unveiling of Mister Hyde”, The Neuroscientist, 21(2), 2015, pp. 126-135. https://doi.org/10.1177/1073858414533827.

Bohl, Vivian y Gangopadhyay, Nivedita, “Theory of mind and the unobservability of other minds”, Philosophical Explorations, 17(2), 2014, pp. 203-222. https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2013.821515.

Catmur, Caroline; “Understanding intentions from actions: Direct perception, inference, and the roles of mirror and mentalizing systems”, Consciousness and Cognition, 36, 2015, pp. 426-433. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2015.03.012.

Cohen, Laurence Jonathan, The Probable and the Provable, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977.

Csibra, Gergely y Gergely, György; “´Obsessed with goals´: Functions and mechanisms of teleological interpretation of actions in humans”, Acta Psychologica, 124(1), 2007, pp. 60-78. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.actpsy.2006.09.007.

Dennet, Daniel C.; The Intentional Stance, Cambridge: MIT press, 1987.

Ferrer Beltrán, Jordi; Prueba y verdad en el derecho (2.a ed.). Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2005.

Gallagher, Shaun y Varga, Somogy; “Social Constraints on the Direct Perception of Emo-tions and Intentions”, Topoi, 33(1), 2014, pp. 185-199. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-013-9203-x.

Gergely, György y Csibra, Gergely; “Teleological reasoning in infancy: The naı̈ve theory of rational action”, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(7), 2003, pp. 287-292. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00128-1.

Goldman, Alvin I.; “Theory of Mind”, en The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195309799.013.0017.

Gómez, Juan Carlos; “Non-Human Primate Theories of Minds”, en Theories of theories of mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

González Lagier, Daniel; “Buenas razones, malas intenciones: Sobre la atribución de intenciones”, Doxa. Cuadernos de Filosofía del Derecho, 26, 2003, pp. 635-685. https://doi.org/10.14198/DOXA2003.26.26.

González Lagier, Daniel; “Filosofía de la mente y prueba de los estados mentales: Una defensa de los criterios de ´sentido común´”, Quaestio facti. Revista Internacional sobre Razonamiento Probatorio, 3, 2022, pp. 48-80. http://dx.doi.org/10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i3.22731.

Haack, Susan; Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology (1.a ed.), Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1993.

Haack, Susan; Defending Science—Within Reason: Between Scientism and Cynicism, Nueva York: Prometheus Books, 2003.

Haack, Susan; Evidence and Inquiry: A Pragmatist Reconstruction of Epistemology (2.a ed.), Nueva York: Prometheus Books, 2009.

Hauser, Marc y Wood, Justin; “Evolving the Capacity to Understand Actions, Intentions, and Goals”, Annual Review of Psychology, 61, 2010, pp. 303-324. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.093008.100434.

Hempel, Carl G.; Philosophy of Natural Science, Englewood: Prentice-Hall, 1966.

Huq, Aziz Z.; “What is Discriminatory Intent?”, Cornell Law Review, 103, 2018, pp. 1211-1292. https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol103/iss5/4/.

Lavelle, Jane Suilin; “Theory-Theory and the Direct Perception of Mental States”, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 3(2), 2012, pp. 213-230. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-012-0094-3.

Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper; Born Free and Equal? A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature of Discrimination, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Marken, Richard S.; “Making Inferences about Intention: Perceptual Control Theory as a ´Theory of Mind´ for Psychologists”, Psychological Reports, 113(1), 2013, pp. 1269-1286. https://doi.org/10.2466/03.49.pr0.113x14z0.

McNeill, William E. S.; “Seeing what you want”, Consciousness and Cognition, 36, 2015, pp. 554-564. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2015.04.018.

Michael, John y Bruin, Leon De; “How direct is social perception?”, Consciousness and Cognition, 36, 2015, pp. 373-375. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2015.08.005.

Pacherie, Elisabeth; “Perceiving intentions”, en A Explicação da Inter-pretação Humana, Lisboa: Edições Colibri, 2005, pp. 401-414. https://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00353955.

Pacherie, Elisabeth; “Toward a Dynamic Theory of Intentions”, en Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006, pp. 145-167. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262162371.003.0009

Ringelheim, Julie; “The burden of proof in anti-discrimination proceedings. A focus on Belgium, France and Ireland”, European Equality Law Review, 2, 2019, pp. 49-64.

Rizzolatti, Giacomo y Craighero, Laila; “The Mirror-Neuron System”, Annual Review of Neuroscience, 27(1), 2004, pp. 169-192. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.neuro.27.070203.144230.

Spaulding, Shannon; “On Whether we Can See Intentions”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 98(2), 2017, pp. 150-170. https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12131.

Toulmin, Stephen E.; The Uses of Argument (Updated Edition), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

von Wright, Georg Henrik; Norm and Action. A Logical Enquiry, Nueva York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963a.

von Wright, Georg Henrik; “Practical Inference”, The Philosophical Review, 72(2), 1963b, pp. 159-179. https://doi.org/10.2307/2183102.

von Wright, Georg Henrik; Explanation and Understanding, Nueva York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971.

von Wright, Georg Henrik; “The Determinants of Action”, en Reason, Action and Experience: Essays in Honor of Raymond Klibansky, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1979, pp. 107-119.

von Wright, Georg Henrik; “Explanation and Understanding of Action”, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 35(135), 1981, pp. 127-142.

von Wright, Georg Henrik; A treatise on induction and probability (Primera edición: 1951). Londres: Routledge, 2001.

Williamson, Timothy; Philosophical Method: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780198810001.001.0001.

Las acciones discriminatorias en el banquillo. Un estudio conceptual y de razonamiento probatorio

Autors/ores

DOI:

Resum

Descàrregues

Publication Facts

Author statements

Indexed in

Referències

Descàrregues

Publicades

Com citar

Número

Secció

Llicència

Metrics

Fer una tramesa

Llengua

Indexada en

SJR