Discriminatory treatment on trial. A conceptual and evidentiary reasoning study
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.7203/CEFD.48.25767
Abstract
This paper is concerned with the proof of discriminatory treatment in two dimen-sions: conceptual and epistemological. It is structured around two questions. First, what is the conceptual meaning of discriminatory treatment? To address questions of proof, one must be clear about its subject matter. Once this is achieved, it becomes clear how important it is to address a second question: How do we arrive at justified beliefs about the intentions and beliefs of others? I will explore two argumentative strategies for doing so, in an attempt to increase the clarity with which we understand the problem behind the last question, and also our ability to solve it.
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