Responsibility for collective performances: a bratmanian proposal
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.7203/CEFD.47.24580
Abstract
This essay seeks to identify the conditions under which responsibility can be established in cases of collective performances, specifically when these give rise to justified judgments of symmetrical responsibility. Establishing responsibility supposes an answer to the question of what collective performance is. However, as the two cases’ discussion shows, there is no clarity regarding the answer to that question nor the importance of answering it. It is argued that, based on Bratman’s model, collective performances can be understood as shared intentions leading to shared activity. The research concludes by showing that this model can respond precisely to what is a collective performance and how judgments of symmetrical responsibility depend on its satisfaction.
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Author Biography
Jose Manuel Fernández, Departamento de Derecho Penal, Universidad Alberto Hurtado Investigador Instituto Milenio VIODEMOS (Violence and Democracy Institute)
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